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Time is one of the central topics of contemporary analytic philosophy, 
and Henri Bergson is one of the most important philosophers of time, but 
still Bergson plays virtually no role in the contemporary analytic debate 
about time. In contrast to his poor reception,1 Henri Bergson has a lot to 
offer analytic philosophy, as I will argue. More precisely, I will illustrate 
what the debates about persistence and ontology of time might gain from 
incorporating Bergsonian ideas.
To do so, I will first investigate persistence, i.e., existence through time. The 
focal point of the contemporary analytic debate is how to conceptualise 
change without letting the involved incompatibilities lead to a logical 
contradiction. This can be called a horizontal way of posing the question, 
namely, how to reconcile two incompatible properties had by one entity at 
two points in time.
Bergson famously asserted that objects are ontologically secondary, mind-
dependent abstractions from an underlying dynamic reality. This opens 
up the possibility to develop a novel account of persistence. As this 
1. An account of why Bergson is so poorly received within the contemporary analytic 
debate is beyond the scope of this paper. The infamous division into “analytic” and 
“continental” philosophy clearly is an important factor in this regard (Chase and 
Reynolds 2010, ch. 2) and especially Bertrand Russell might have played a significant 
part (Vrahimis 2011).
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theory, which I call produrantism, focuses on the abstractions, it can be 
characterised as a vertical account.
The contemporary analytic debate about persistence usually assumes 
eternalism, i.e., that all times are ontologically on a par. This assumption is 
far from unproblematic, however. Thus, the debate about persistence must 
be discussed in the wider context of temporal ontology. Here Bergson’s 
famous critique of the spatialisation of time, i.e., our tendency to confuse 
our (spatial) representations of time with time itself, may help to overcome 
the eternalistic restriction.2
I. Red at t1; Blue at t2: Persistence According to the Contemporary 
Analytic Debate
The contemporary analytic debate about persistence is de facto a debate 
about change.3 Virtually all objects change during their existence. For an 
easy example think of a mood light changing its colour from red, say at 
t1, to blue, say at t2. If we depict time horizontally from left to right, the 
whole situation looks like figure 1.
FIGURE 1. Red at t1 and blue at t2.
The first thing to note is that not all combinations of properties are 
sufficient to constitute change. Of course, the properties involved need to 
be different, because staying red would be a case of stability, not of change. 
Likewise, the properties involved in a change need to be incompatible, i.e., 
2. I do not claim that we take time to be spatial because the representations we use 
are spatial. This would indeed be a fallacy. Mellor has convincingly argued against this 
inference (Mellor 2012, 164). But this is not what is at stake. I take the wide-spread spatial 
representations of time only as indicator of the often implicit, uncritical assumption of 
spatialised time.
3. I will speak rather indiscriminately of the problem of persistence in this paper. However, 
I think that what is usually discussed under this heading, namely, how to conceptualise 
change, is only part of persistence. Cases of stability are clearly also cases of persistence, 
and a comprehensive account of persistence needs to include them as well (Fischer 2017).
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being red must exclude being blue in a way in which being square does 
not.
Incompatible different properties, like red and blue, are still not enough 
to characterise change, because, to say it with the words of Hugh Mellor, 
“change needs identity as well as difference” (Mellor 1998, 98). This is so 
because change needs to be differentiated from exchange. Ontologically, it 
makes a difference whether one entity changes or whether it is exchanged 
with another entity, even if this second entity is very similar to the first 
one.
If one entity exemplifies incompatible properties, a contradiction is right 
around the corner. Is not the mood light in our example red and non-red 
(by being blue)? Most philosophers agree that even in cases of change a 
full-blown logical contradiction needs to be avoided. Thus, the heart of 
the contemporary debate about persistence is how to conceptualise change 
in such a way that the involved incompatible properties do not lead to a 
contradiction regarding the persisting entity.
The mainstream analytic debate about persistence4 can be split up into 
two camps: endurantistic and perdurantistic solutions.5 Endurantism is 
supposed to be more intuitive than perdurantism, because it does not 
tamper with the everyday conception of objects. Enduring objects are 
three-dimensional. They exist through time by being wholly present at 
each moment of their existence and, thus, they are multi-located in (space-)
time.6 According to perdurantism objects are four-dimensional, extended 
in time as well as in space.
A number of different endurantistic suggestions have been proposed to 
avoid the looming contradiction in the context of change. One strategy 
is to put a time index on the having of the relevant properties, either by 
time-indexing the copula (is
t1
) (Johnston 1987, 129) or adding a temporal 
adverb (t1-ly) (Haslanger 1989). Another strategy would be to interpret 
the situation using non-contradictory relations (Lewis 1986, 204). The 
mood light in our example would thus stand in the red-relation to t1 and 
4. In the context of this paper, I can only briefly sketch the contemporary analytic debate 
about persistence. I have spelled out the different accounts in detail elsewhere (Fischer 
2016, 13).
5. We owe this well-known account of the different camps to David Lewis (Lewis 1986, 204).
6. “Multi-location” is a terminus technicus. For our purposes it is sufficient to characterise 
it as having more than one exact location. For more on multi-location see (Costa et al. 
2020).
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in the blue-relation to t2. Yet another version of endurantism would be 
to take a three-place relation of property-exemplification (Meixner 2006, 
95), which combines objects, times and properties. This relation would 
then hold for our mood light t1 and red, as well as for the mood light t2 
and blue. No contradiction arises here either.
Perdurantism can be understood as putting a time-index on the object itself, 
splitting it up into different (temporal) parts. This may seem unintuitive, 
but it does avoid the looming contradiction. The incompatibility of the 
properties involved is only problematic if they are had by the same entity 
but, following perdurantism, the temporal parts are the primary property 
bearer. So, in our example there is a red temporal part (tp1) and a blue 
temporal part (tp2), according to the perdurantist, but as these are not 
identical, no contradiction arises. Furthermore, if both are part of the same 
perduring object (OP), we have change (see figure 2), if not exchange.7
FIGURE 2. Depicting perdurantism
Taking a bird’s-eye view on the debate about persistence reveals a shared 
assumption of all the accounts I have sketched so far. The debate takes 
incompatible properties exemplified at different times as its contentual 
starting point. Or, to put it even more plainly, the debate starts with red 
at t1 and blue at t2 (remember figure  1). Persistence in contemporary 
analytic philosophy is a purely horizontal question: How to reconcile the 
incompatibility of the properties at t1 and t2 with the fact that they (in 
some way or other) belong to the same entity.8
7. One might think that perdurantism is a dissolution rather than a solution of the 
problem because at each point in time there is only the respective temporal part and 
thus no strict identity over time. But this is controversial within the perdurantist camp. 
Ted Sider, for example, asserts that also the whole is located at each point in time (Sider 
2001, 54).
8. Another, widely ignored question, is how the incompatible properties got to be there 
in the first place. That is, what are the change-makers? What (metaphysically) makes it 
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With this level of abstraction in view, we can now try to think about 
a novel contribution to the debate, which is not just another variation 
on what has already been given, not just a further idea where to put the 
time-index. It is at this point that the work of Henri Bergson becomes 
relevant, who argued that the “objects” (as well as the properties) about 
which I have been speaking so uncritically are actually mind-dependent 
abstractions from an underlying, ongoing, processual reality. This, of 
course, needs to be spelled out — and I will do so in the next section. 
The main idea is that with Bergson we can focus on the vertical question, 
namely how the abstractions relate to the underlying reality. I will argue 
that this understanding also provides an answer to the horizontal question.
II. Tackling the Problem of Persistence with Bergson: Boon and Bane 
of Abstractions
In this section, I want to illustrate how one of Bergson’s central ideas can 
help to develop a novel kind of solution to the problem of persistence. At 
first, it might seem that the Bergsonian distinction between abstractions 
and the underlying processes is irrelevant, because it is diagonal to the 
problems discussed in the contemporary debate about persistence. But quite 
contrarily, this very feature allows for the development of a novel solution 
that is not just another slightly tweaked endurantism or perdurantism. 
On top of that, it allows for a broader scope of application, because the 
presented solution is not just tailor-made to solve a specific philosophical 
problem but derived from more general considerations.
Bergson criticises the very notions of objects and properties at a fundamental 
level. According to him, if one looks more closely, one can see that what 
is called “object” is actually only a relatively stable entity. Even in the most 
solid entities there is more change than one initially suspects. And perhaps 
even more surprisingly, the same holds true for properties. Following 
Bergson, every quality in the end is change. 
Very roughly, Bergson holds that we take something like snapshots from 
an underlying, ever-changing reality. We do so because we are actors, i.e., 
we need the stable snapshots to plan and evaluate our actions in the world. 
It is an illusion, however, to confuse this picture of the world, which is 
largely due to our access to it, with reality itself. We mark off relatively 
isolated systems and then call them “objects,” and we do so by means 
that the mood light changes from red to blue. I take dispositions to hold an important 
role in answering this question (Fischer 2020).
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of qualities, which themselves decompose “into an enormous number of 
elementary movements” (Bergson 1911, 326-327). 
Take the most popular example of an “object” in philosophy nowadays, 
a table. Although tables seem pretty enduring, they actually change all 
the time. Every use leaves micro-scratches behind, and even if they are 
not used, the surface is always made up of different atoms. But this is not 
only the case for tables. Even crystals, the epitome of stability, grow and 
disaggregate over time.9
Note that this need not be understood as a degradation of objects. First 
of all, one can take objects ontologically seriously and need not question 
their reality. The assertion that objects do not occur on the fundamental 
ontological level does not imply that objects do not occur on any level of 
ontology.10 But also, for practical purposes, one need not demote objects, 
given this outset. Bergson explicates the usefulness of object-thinking at 
length. He acknowledges modern science without reservation, although 
it is based on the aforementioned static snapshots of reality. Beginning 
with a complex and dynamic reality, we block out most of the multifarious 
aspects. The problem is that in the process of abstraction something 
essential goes missing. 
This rough and ready characterisation of abstractions is sufficient for the 
question that concerns this paper, namely the potential impact on the 
debate about persistence. We will leave aside the exegetical correctness 
and overall tenability of the account for now. Let us instead return to 
the problem of persistence and see how Bergson’s account of abstractions 
applies to it.11 Reconsider our earlier example of the change from red to 
blue. The objects (as well as the properties) involved in this change are 
abstractions, following Bergson. We pick out the mood light as a relatively 
9. With qualities it is a little trickier, but the status of abstractions of the properties is not 
especially important in our context, so we can bracket it.
10. This corresponds to the distinction between reduction and elimination from 
philosophy of mind (see e.g., William 2020). Basically, one could either completely 
eliminate mental properties from ontology or reduce them to physical. The same goes 
for objects in our context; they can either be eliminated from ontology or reduced to 
underlying processes. The difference is that they are still part of ontology according to the 
reductive strategy, albeit not ontologically fundamental.
11. Bergson’s treatment of individuality may offer a shortcut to avoiding the problem of 
persistence. Because there is constant change, there is never full individuality (Bergson 
1911, 16). It follows from this that identity over time cannot be ascribed. At best, one 
might argue, identity would come in degrees, but the problem of persistence needs strict 
identity to arise.
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stable system and ascribe redness to it. Given the distinction between 
abstractions and the underlying dynamic reality, we can develop a novel 
account of persistence. Instead of objects, this account posits processes at 
the ontologically fundamental level and hence was called “produrantism.”12
Now, following produrantism, the underlying processes are the actual 
persisting entities. The primary property bearers are abstractions from these 
processes, and, hence, they are not identical to the processes themselves. 
The important thing is that the two abstractions involved are not identical 
to each other (a1 ≠ a2) either, and thus red and blue are not exemplified by 
the same entity (see figure 3).
FIGURE 3. Depicting produrantism
One might notice that produrantism’s answer to the problem of persistence 
has the same structure as perdurantism:13 The contradiction is avoided by 
the involvement of more than one primary property bearer (tp1 and tp2 
in the case of perdurantism; a1 and a2 in the case of produrantism). This, 
of course, does not mean that produrantism de facto is perdurantism. The 
positions only have the same structure; the way they are metaphysically 
spelled out is quite different. Produrantism and perdurantism also have a 
12. I coined the term “produrantism” (Fischer 2017). As is the case with perdurantism 
and endurantism, produrantism is not one account, but a family or camp of accounts. 
While it is built in the same general spirit, Anne Sophie Meincke holds a version of 
produrantism quite different from my account (Meincke 2019). Also, Johanna Seibt’s 
recurrence theory is located in the produrantist camp (Seibt 1990; 2007).
13. The elaboration of the structure of the perdurantistic account goes back to Jeffery 
Brower (2010). Brower himself has devised a version of endurantism which is structurally 
identical to perdurantism, i.e., the primary property bearers at different times are 
neither identical to the persisting entity nor to each other. The metaphysical flesh to 
these structural bones, however, is quite different, as Brower’s account is deeply rooted in 
Aristotelian hylomorphism.
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very different scope of application. Whereas perdurantism is only intended 
as a solution to a specific philosophical problem, the distinction between 
abstractions and the underlying process is much more general. The solution 
to the problem of persistence comes out as a side-effect, so to say.
Having shown how the contradiction is avoided, we also need to consider 
the distinction between change and exchange in the produrantistic picture. 
On the classical account, change concerns one object with incompatible 
properties, while exchange concerns more than one object. Conceptually, 
we can still uphold the difference between change and exchange, given 
produrantism. Yet in contrast to the classical accounts, both concepts can be 
applied to the same physical situation according to produrantism. This is so 
because the classical accounts assume objects on the fundamental ontological 
level. Thus, given a specific situation, the number of objects is fixed, and 
therefore it is also fixed whether this situation is a case of change or exchange.
Produrantism’s flexibility in the application of the concepts change and 
exchange is a feature, however, not a bug! Take the example of someone being 
shot. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that they die right away. Is this a case of 
change or of exchange? On the one hand, a living person goes out of existence, 
and a corpse comes into existence, which is an exchange. But regarding the 
lump of matter on the other hand, the bullet hole is only a minor change: 
The corpse has nearly the same mass, position, etc. and consists of the same 
matter. There is no inherent contradiction in applying both concepts, change 
and exchange, to the same physical situation, and the resulting descriptions 
are actually quite close to our everyday rendering of the situation.
As an interim conclusion, we can say that produrantism is a viable solution 
to the problem of persistence: It avoids the contradiction in the context 
of change and gives a satisfactory answer regarding the difference between 
change and exchange. In stark contrast to the rest of the accounts in 
the contemporary debate about persistence, produrantism brings what 
I have called the vertical question into consideration. This is possible 
because produrantism does not take objects as ontologically fundamental 
but respects the Bergsonian idea that objects are abstractions from an 
underlying dynamical reality.
Bergson’s attack on the standard account of objects and properties is not an 
isolated stance but is part of an overarching campaign against the uncritical 
assumption of spatialised time. In the next section, I will expound what 
spatialisation of time is and why Bergson criticises it. This in turn questions 
the fundament of the debate about persistence. The way the debate about 
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persistence is usually framed presupposes eternalism. I will show why this 
presupposition is dubious and how we might overcome it if we reject 
spatialised time in fundamental ontology.
III. Non-spatialised Time: Beyond the Eternalistic Limitation
Eternalism is standardly, if often tacitly, assumed in the contemporary 
debate about persistence, and this assumption is taken to be unproblematic. 
Either eternalism is simply taken for granted or it is chosen for ease of 
illustration (Balashov 2010, 11). But eternalism does not really provide 
an equal ground to compare theories of persistence. Not only has it been 
argued (Benovsky 2007) that eternalism is biased towards perdurantism,14 
but eternalism is also in tension with a central conviction many non-
perdurantists hold, namely that temporal becoming is absolute.15
I will unearth a common root of the belief that the eternalistic assumption is 
unproblematic and the implicit preference of certain theories of persistence 
in the contemporary analytic debate about persistence. What Bergson calls 
spatialisation of time actually pertains to and affects both, the debate about 
the ontology of time and the debate about persistence, or so I will argue. 
According to Bergson, our concept of time consists of two parts: durée 
and space. I use “durée” as a terminus technicus because the translation 
“duration” comes with the wrong connotations. Duration sounds like 
something enduring (in the non-technical sense), something staying in 
existence. Durée, however, has almost the opposite meaning for Bergson. 
Durée “means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration 
of the absolutely new” (Bergson 1911).
Now, Bergson asserts that “time, understood in the sense of a medium in 
which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space” (Bergson 
1910, 91). Basically, there are two ways of counting: you could either 
directly count objects in space, for example by marking them off one by 
one; or you could represent them in an ideal space. Then you (mentally) 
14. Marcello Oreste Fiocco even goes one step further and argues that what he calls 
ontological homogeneity, namely that “all moments in time have the same ontological 
status” is only compatible with perdurantism (Fiocco 2010, 66). While I agree with much 
of his paper, I still think that its demarcation criterion is slightly off. As I will argue below, 
the moving spotlight theory is “guilty” of spatialising time, although it clearly rejects 
Fiocco’s ontological homogeneity thesis.
15. Roughly, “absolute becoming” is the idea that events happen in a non-relative sense. 
For a critical examination of this concept see Savitt (2002). We will come back to the 
concept later in this article.
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place them in a homogenous medium. The important part is that you 
juxtapose the objects in order to count them, i.e., you put them together 
next to each other. Juxtaposition is the defining criterion of space, so, 
contrary to what one might think, Bergson argues that counting always 
involves space — either directly or via a mental act. If you ever had only 
one object, then the number could not increase, and hence there could be 
no counting. You need the former objects (or their representations, or the 
memory, …) next to the present object.
This explains why Bergson asserts that time, understood as the medium of 
counting, is only space. The conditional character of this statement cannot 
be overemphasised. Spatialised time is but one aspect of time. One of the 
central points in Bergson’s work, perhaps the central point, is that there is 
another aspect of time: durée, real duration. Of course, we cannot hope to 
discuss this concept exhaustively in this context but let me try to illustrate 
the differentiation of durée and spatialised time.
If you hear the bell from a nearby tower ringing, there are two things you 
can do, according to Bergson. You can either count the tolls or you can 
listen to the melody. Conceptually, one excludes the other. If you count 
the tolls, you necessarily abstract away from the individual characteristics 
of the tolls. They must be considered as the same and distinguished. You 
need to consider them external to each other to arrive at a number. But 
if you want the melody to unfold, you cannot separate the tolls and you 
cannot ignore the individual characteristics of the tolls. While space is 
associated with quantitative multiplicity, as in counting, the melody to the 
bell forms another kind of multiplicity: qualitative multiplicity. Qualitative 
multiplicity, then, is associated with durée for Bergson.
Given that there is an asymmetry between these two aspects of time, since 
durée is more fundamental than spatialised time, one might wonder whether 
spatialised time really is time. But this is beside the point. Whether you 
stigmatise spatialised time as distorted time, or even insist that it is not really 
time anymore; this is just a haggle about words. The decisive point is that 
there is durée, real duration, for Bergson, and that it would be misguided 
to base the philosophical investigation into time just on spatialised time. 
Spatialised time is acceptable (and even advantageous) for everyday 
planning and science, but at the latest when it comes to metaphysics, when 
we are occupied with ultimate reality, we must investigate durée.
The focus of this paper is not on Bergson’s ideas themselves, but on their 
possible implications for the contemporary analytic debate about time. 
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So, I will now turn to the alleged benefit of the Bergsonian differentiation 
of durée and spatialised time for the debates about persistence and the 
ontology of time.16
The contemporary analytic debate about persistence (implicitly) assumes 
eternalism, as we have noted. The remainder of this article will introduce 
eternalism and the associated debate about the ontology of time, and then 
outline the possible implications of Bergson’s critique of spatialised time in 
this context. Lastly, we will return to the debate about persistence to evince 
the bias of eternalism and spatialised time and how to overcome it.
The debate about the ontology of time can be understood as a debate about 
which times are real.17 There are four main positions in the contemporary 
analytic debate: presentism, eternalism, moving spotlight theory and 
growing block theory. The two major positions are also the “extreme” 
positions: eternalism and presentism. According to presentism, only the 
present is real, whereas all times, past present and future, are ontologically 
on a par according to eternalism. The growing block theory (GBT) can 
be seen as a middle position between eternalism and presentism, as it 
asserts the reality of the past up until and including the present but denies 
the existence of the future. The name-giving metaphor of the moving 
spotlight theory (MST) is that of temporal “spotlight” highlighting one 
time after the other as the present. Thus, the MST could be captured as a 
combination of eternalism and presentism: MST holds that all times are 
real (as does eternalism), but also posits an ontologically special status of 
the present (as does presentism).
The debate about the nature of time is quite complex, so that we cannot 
go into detail here, but eternalism is clearly in the spirit of spatialised time. 
According to the eternalist, all times are ontologically on a par; and all 
16. The rest of this section may be understood hypothetically, since I have not argued 
for the idea of spatialised time. Rather, the aim is to motivate further research into the 
intersection of Bergson’s work and contemporary analytic philosophy of time. Actually, 
if the implications of accepting the Bergsonian differentiation of durée and spatialised 
time are plausible, this would be a good reason to accept the distinction in the first place.
17. There are different ways to frame the debate about the ontology of time. Some people 
talk about non-present times and others about non-present objects or objects located 
at non-present times. The status of these non-present entities is also discussed under 
different headings: sometimes the debate is about their existence and sometimes about 
their reality. I do not take these differences to be insignificant, but I cannot discuss them 
in the context of this paper. For more on this see Fischer (2016, 4-8). Hence, I will switch 
between the different formulations more or less indiscriminately.
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objects, past, present and future, exist. This entails a juxtaposition in the 
strongest sense. Following eternalism, all entities, be they points of time or 
objects, must be considered together and beside each other.
MST too assumes the coexistence of all moments and thus also presupposes 
spatialised time. The difference is that defenders of MST also believe that 
some times/objects are ontologically distinguished from others, namely 
the present ones. But the MST-way of marking the present against a 
background of non-present entities already requires juxtaposition in the 
Bergsonian sense.
This points to something crucial: the ideas of juxtaposition and spatialisation 
are much broader than just accepting more than one moment. To posit 
the ontological coexistence or coreality of multiple times, as eternalism 
and GBT do, is admittedly to juxtapose these times and thus to spatialise 
time, according to Bergson. But there are other ways to spatialise. Even a 
seemingly dynamic view of time according to which ever only one but ever 
a different moment of time, the “present,” is ontologically distinguished 
from a background of proto-times constitutes a way of juxtaposing and 
hence spatialising. Every distinction presupposes the prior being-on-a-par 
of entities, of which some are then distinguished. Being-on-a-par, however 
this be specifically conceived, somehow necessarily implies a quantitative 
plurality of entities; and to posit a quantitative plurality of entities is 
necessarily to leave the realm of pure durée.
Now we can see that Bergson’s critique of spatialised time does not cut exactly 
parallel to the division of the debate about the nature of time into presentism, 
eternalism, MST and GBT. Rather, it depends on how the positions are spelled 
out. As we have seen, eternalism and MST presuppose spatialised time, but 
there are spatialised versions of presentism too.18 Basically whenever temporal 
existence, be it of moments themselves or of objects at moments, is understood 
in a relative manner, i.e., relative to some background, the account in question 
spatialises. Standardly, however, presentists posit “absolute” becoming. Even 
without further spelling out the notoriously hard to grasp concept of absolute 
becoming, it is clear that it excludes spatialisation already at a very basic level 
and that the uncritical assumption of spatialised time thus disadvantages the 
standard versions of presentism. 
The same goes for GBT: Although there are versions which end up defining 
time in a relative manner and thus count as spatialisers, according to most 
18. Like Orilia’s moderate presentism (Orilia 2016).
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GBT-accounts the future is not something which is given in some way 
and then only becomes actualised. Already the characterisation of GBT by 
C. D. Broad makes this clear: “[T]he essence of a present event is not that 
it precedes future events, but that there is quite literally nothing to which 
it has the relation of precedence” (Broad 1923, 66). Equally, the same is 
asserted by contemporary representatives of GBT: “There thus always is an 
edge of becoming beyond which there is literally nothing in time which 
is as yet to come” (Correia and Rosenkranz 2018, v). Thus, according to 
most versions of GBT and presentism, temporal existence is not something 
relative; but it would have to be if spatialised time were all we had.19
Likewise, the “problem” of persistence can only arise in the context of 
spatialised time. If you think about t1 and t2 together and next to each other, 
you juxtapose them. If you only ever have the present, no contradiction 
can arise in the first place. At the same time the uncritical assumption of 
spatialised time gives an advantage to accounts that incorporate a relative 
understanding of change. This is where the true power of Bergson’s critique 
of spatialisation unfolds, as perdurantism requires spatialised time.20 So, 
while endurantism is at least expiable given eternalism and hence spatialised 
time, perdurantism is incompatible with real durée. It is only due to the 
uncritical assumption of spatialised time that perdurantism is considered 
an attractive, or indeed viable account of persistence.
A relative definition of change is a sine qua non for perdurantism. The 
defining criterion of perduring objects is that they are extended in time and 
consist of multiple temporal parts. The concept of extension would be taken 
ad absurdum if it is necessarily zero as well as the concept of part would, if 
there is necessarily ever only one. There is nothing in endurantism, though, 
that requires juxtaposition of multiple times or proto-times.21 In principle, 
endurantism is open to an absolute definition of change. That the debate 
about persistence de facto has been a debate about how to relativise the 
19. Bergson’s distinction between pure durée and spatialised time explains why some 
people have thought that presentism cannot even be spelled out consistently (Sider 2001, 
64). If spatialised time is presupposed, this is no wonder.
20. It is sometimes claimed that perdurantism is incompatible with presentism; or that 
it requires eternalism. With the concept of spatialised time we can be more precise: 
perdurantism requires juxtaposition of different times and can only be spelled out in 
spatialised terms.
21. Obviously, also produrantism does not require a relative definition of change. In 
principle, it is compatible with relative change, but it unfolds it true potential if pared 
with non-spatialised time and absolute change.
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concept of change, i.e., where to put the temporal index, is due to the 
uncritical assumption of spatialised time.
The contemporary analytic debate about persistence was never fair because 
the central question was framed in a way that only allowed relative 
definitions of change as an answer. This was no problem for perdurantism, 
as it follows from its central conviction; but it restricted endurantism to 
certain forms that might not have been its strongest versions.22 Bergson’s 
critique of spatialised time has revealed this bias in the debate. Overcoming 
it, however, does not even out the scales, but makes perdurantism untenable.
This, of course, is only half the story. After the explanation of the partiality 
of the contemporary debate about time, positive accounts of persistence 
and the ontology of time which do not presuppose spatialised time would 
have to be developed. One must be careful not to slip back into vocabulary 
and images of juxtaposition, which is not so easy because they pervade 
ordinary and scientific language.23 Such a task naturally transcends 
the possibilities of a paper like this but let me point out that Bergson’s 
characterisation of durée as invention, “the creation of forms, the continual 
elaboration of the absolutely new” (Bergson 1911, 14), seems to fit (most 
forms of ) presentism and GBT quite well.
IV. Conclusion: All’s Well?
In this paper, I have promoted a rereading of Bergson. I think that 
contemporary analytic philosophy of time, especially the debates about 
persistence and the ontology of time, could benefit from Bergson’s insights, 
and I have tried to illustrate how they could be useful.
The debate about persistence is de facto a debate about how to conceptualise 
change without a contradiction. Other questions in the context of 
persistence are disregarded, whether because of an unquestioned paradigm 
or just because of the focus of the debate. As with all philosophical debates, 
a position “from outside” can be helpful to overcome these limitations.
Bergson has asserted that objects (and properties) are (mind-dependent) 
abstractions from an underlying dynamic reality. While the contemporary 
analytic debate focuses on the horizontal question of reconciling incompatible 
properties at different times, abstractions concern the horizontal question 
of which mechanisms are at work to get from the underlying reality to the 
22. For example, note that endurantism implies the problematic concept of multi-
location only under the assumption of spatialised time.
23. Hence, figure 3 should not be taken at face value, but just as a helpful heuristic.
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relatively isolated systems that we call “objects.” This stance incorporates 
the contemporary problem of persistence into a wider setting. It enables a 
holistic discussion of the phenomenon of persistence, and, en passant, offers 
a solution to the horizontal question: As the primary property bearers are 
not identical over time, no contradiction can arise.
These considerations fit into Bergson’s general agenda. Bergson insists that 
our strong focus on spatialised time ignores the fundamental dynamic 
reality: pure durée. He explains why spatialised time is so encompassing, 
but also why for metaphysical purposes we cannot ignore durée. It turns out 
that spatialised time systemically disadvantages presentism and GBT, and 
also privileges accounts of persistence with relative definitions of change.
Bibliography
Balashov, Yuri. 2010. Persistence and Spacetime. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Benovsky, Jiri. 2007. “On Presentist Perdurantism.” Sats: Nordic Journal of 
Philosophy. 8(2): 79-88.
Bergson, Henri. 1910. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data 
of Consciousness. Translated by F. L. Pogson, London: Allen and Unwin.
Bergson, Henri. 1911. Creative Evolution. Translated by Arthur Mitchell. 
New York: Random House.
Broad, Charlie Dunbar. 1923. Scientific Thought: A Philosophical Analysis 
of Some of its Fundamental Concepts. London: Taylor & Francis.
Brower, Jeffrey. 2010. “Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the 
Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.” Mind 119: 883-905.
Chase, James, and Jack Reynolds. 2010. Analytic Versus Continental: 
Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Correia, Fabrice, and Sven Rosenkranz. 2018. Nothing To Come: A Defence 
of the Growing Block Theory of Time. New York: Springer Verlag.
Costa, Damiano, and Claudio Calosi. 2020. “The Multi-Location 
Trilemma.” Erkenntnis. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s10670-020-00230-7.
Dainton, Barry. 2017. “Bergson on Temporal Experience and Durée 
Réelle.” In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience, 
edited by Ian Phillips, 93-106. London: Routledge.
66 Bergsoniana N°1 | 2021
Fischer, Florian. 2016. “Philosophy of Time: A Slightly Opinionated 
Introduction.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 30(2): 3-28.
Fischer, Florian. 2017. “Persistence Reconsidered: Beyond the Endurance/
Perdurance Distinction.” In Logic and Philosophy of Time: Themes from 
Prior, edited by Per Hasle, Patrick Blackburn and Peter Øhrstrøm, 51-
66. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press.
Fiocco, Marcello Oreste. 2010. “Temporary Intrinsics and Relativization.” 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 9: 64-77.
Fischer, Florian. 2020. “Limit Deciding Dispositions: A Metaphysical 
Symmetry-Breaker for the Limit Decision Problem.” Philosophy 
Kitchen 13: 129-140. 
Haslanger, Sally. 1989. “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.” Analysis 
49(3) :119-125.
Johnston, Mark. 1987. “Is There a Problem about Persistence?” Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society 61:107-135.
Lewis, David Kellogg. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Hoboken: Blackwell 
Publishers.
Meincke, Anne Sophie. 2019. “The Disappearance of Change: Towards a 
Process Account of Persistence.” International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies 27(1): 12-30.
Meixner, Uwe. 2006. David Lewis. Paderborn: Mentis.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1998. Real Time II. London: Routledge.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2012. Mind, Meaning and Reality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Orilia, Francesco. 2016. “Moderate Presentism.” Philosophical Studies 
173(3): 586-607. 
Savitt, Steven. 2002. “On Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage.” 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50: 153-167.
Seibt, Johanna. 1990. Towards Process Ontology: A Critical Study in the 
Premises of Substance Ontology. UMI-Publications.
Seibt, Johanna. 2007. “Beyond Endurance and Perdurance: Recurrent 
Dynamics.” In Persistence, edited by Christian Kanzian, 133-65. 
Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag.
Sider, Ted. 2001. Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and 
Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bergsonian Answers to Contemporary Persistence Questions 67
Vrahimis, Andreas. 2011. “Russell’s Critique of Bergson and the Divide 
Between ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental Philosophy’.” Balkan Journal of 
Philosophy 3(1):123-134.
William, Ramsey. 2020. “Eliminative Materialism.” The Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2020/entries/materialism-eliminative/.
University of Siegen - Florian Fischer is currently assistant professor at the 
University of Siegen. His research focuses on the intersection of time and modality, 
especially the connection between present and possibility. He is president of the 
Society for Philosophy of Time (SPoT) and has organised numerous academic 
events investigating time from various perspectives (see http://s-p-o-t.weebly.
com). He is head of the DFG-Network Change and Change-Makers (CCM), 
which strives to develop a novel concept of persistence that can naturally be 
applied to a wide array of sciences (see https://ccm.uni-siegen.de).
***
Abstract: This paper promotes the incorporation of Bergsonian ideas into contemporary 
analytic philosophy of time. First, Bergson’s claim that objects are ontologically 
secondary, mind-dependent abstractions from an underlying dynamic reality, opens up 
the possibility to develop a novel account of persistence, produrantism, perpendicular to 
the opposing theories, perdurantism and endurantism. Second, Bergson’s famous critique 
of the spatialisation of time explains why the debate about persistence was partial in 
the first place. Accepting a juxtaposition of multiple times or proto-times, which the 
implicitly assumed eternalism does, favours accounts of persistence which incorporate a 
relational definition of change, especially perdurantism.
Keywords: persistence, change, produrantism, eternalism, spatialisation of time.
Résumé : Cet article défend l’incorporation des idées bergsoniennes dans la philosophie 
analytique contemporaine du temps. Premièrement, l’affirmation de Bergson selon 
laquelle les objets sont des abstractions ontologiquement secondaires, dépendantes de 
l’esprit d’une réalité dynamique sous-jacente, ouvre la possibilité de développer une 
nouvelle conception de la persistance, le produrantisme, perpendiculaire aux théories 
opposées, le perdurantisme et l’endurantisme. Deuxièmement, la célèbre critique de 
Bergson de la spatialisation du temps explique pourquoi le débat sur la persistance a 
été partiel en premier lieu. Accepter une juxtaposition de temps multiples ou de proto-
temps, ce que fait l’éternalisme implicitement supposé, favorise les conceptions de la 
persistance qui incorporent une définition relationnelle du changement, notamment le 
perdurantisme.
Mots-clés : persistance, changement, produrantisme, éternalisme, spatialisation du temps.

